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1STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78-2-2 and UCA §78-2a-
3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Whether the trial Court erred in failing to award Mr. Barker his requested
attorney fees.
Determinative law:
Anglin vs. Contracting Fabrication Machine, Inc, 37 P 3d 267 (Utah Appellate 2001)
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P 3d 1041 (Utah 2007)
UCA § 78-27-56.5
Standard of review:
When reviewing attorney fee decisions that involve questions of law the Appellate
Court reviews for correctness.
Pochynok Company, Inc. v. Smedsrud, 116 P.3d 353, 355 (Utah 2005).
II. Whether the trial Court erred in failing to award costs to Mr. Barker.
Determinative law:
URCP Rule 54
URCP Rule 59
Standard of review:
This is purely an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant
Court accords the Trial Court=s legal conclusions no deference and reviews them for
correctness.
Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc., 983 P 2d 575 (Utah 1999).
2DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
Copies of all determinative constitution provisions, statutes, and rules are attached
hereto as Addendum “B”.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was initiated by the Plaintiff with the filing of a Complaint on or about
June 12, 2006 R. 1. The Defendants answered and Defendant Bushnell filed cross-claims
and a third party complaint against Dale K. Barker Jr. R.39. After an extended period of
discovery, the matter came before the court for a bench trial which took place on March
31 through April 3, 2008. R. 434-437.
At the close of the Defendants case in chief, the Court dismissed the Third Party
Complaint and al but one issue of Bushnel’s counterclaim. R.437, Pg. 646, 701-
702,705.
After the Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment,
Plaintiff filed a timely motion under Rule 59. R.489. After argument that motion was
denied and this appeal was subsequently taken.R.594, R.659.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Defendant John Bushnel is a tax cheat. He didn’t file tax returns for the years 
1995 through 2003. R. 460. When he was caught by the IRS, he prepared returns for
1995 and 1996 and submitted them to the IRS. In the spring of 2005 he came to the
Company and asked it to review the returns he had prepared for 1995 and 1996 and to
prepare tax returns for himself and his corporation Bushnet, Inc. through 2004. R.460.
3Third Party Defendant Dale K. Barker, Jr. is, and was at all times relevant to this case, the
President of the Company. The Company agreed to perform the work as requested.
R.461. Subsequently Bushnell also requested the Company negotiate with the IRS on his
behalf. R.461. For the services performed on behalf of Bushnell, the Company billed
$19,000.00. Plaintiff’sExhibit #4. Bushnell paid $2,180.00 of those bills. For the
services performed on behalf of Bushnet the Plaintiff biled $45,355.20. Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit #5. Of this amount, $12,680.20 was reimbursement for taxes paid on Bushnel’s 
behalf to the IRS. The amount for services rendered was actually $32,675.00 of which
Bushnet paid $17,639.80. Plaintiff’s Exhibit #5.Bushnell signed documents accepting the
amount of the bilings and the work that had been performed. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 66-74.
Bushnell made a series of promises that he would pay the amounts owing. Plaintiffs
Exhibit #7. In spite of these acceptances and promises, Bushnell failed to pay the
balances owing. Finally, the Company brought suit to collect the balances. R.1. Bushnell
countered by filing a counterclaim and third party complaint.
Bushnell countered by filing a counterclaim alleging negligence and breach of
contract. Bushnell also filed a Third Party Complaint alleging that Mr. Barker was the
alter ego of the Dale K. Barker Co., P.C.. The Third Party Complaint sought damages
under the written contracts entered into by Bushnell and Dale K. Barker Company, P.C.
and requested attorney fees against Mr. Barker pursuant to the contracts.R.30.
The matter eventually came on for trial. At the close of Bushnel’s case, Mr.
Barker made a motion pursuant to Rule 50 for dismissal of the Third Party
4Complaint.R.437 P.630. The Court granted the motion. R.437 P.647. After the close of
trial, the Court requested the parties submit their claims for fees and costs. Mr. Barker
complied with the Court’s order. R.238 The Court declined to award Mr. Barker any of
the requested costs and fees. R.575
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal presents two issues. Both issues are issues of law. The first issue is
whether Mr. Barker is entitled to attorney fees for his successful defense of the Third
Party Complaint. The Third Party Complaint alleged Mr. Barker was the alter ego of
Dale K Barker Co., P.C. (the “Company”) and that he was therefore subject to claims for
damages brought by Bushnell based on the contract entered into between Bushnell and
the Company. These damages included a claim for costs and attorney fees under the
contract.
The trial Court relied on the case of Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining,
Inc., 37 P.3d 267 (Utah App. 2001) in denying Mr. Barker’s claim for fees.  The trial 
court read the case’s holding broadly to find that the reciprocal atorney fees statute, 
UCA §78B-5-826 (2008), does not allow recovery of fees to a party if they were not a
party to the original contract being sued upon.  The trial court’s broad interpretation is 
contrary to the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P 3d 1041
(Utah 2007).
In Bilanzich the Utah Supreme Court stated, AWe hold that Utah Code
section 78-27-56.5 grants the district court discretion to award attorney fees and costs to a
5prevailing party if the writing that forms the basis of the lawsuit provides attorney fees
for at least one party.@ Bilanzich at 1043 (emphasis added). In Bilanzich the issue was
whether a party to the lawsuit could recover fees where the agreement on which the claim
was made was itself unenforceable. In deciding this issue the Supreme Court undertook a
detailed analysis of the policies underlying the statute. The Court found that the purpose
of the statute was to “even the playing field” between the parties. If Bushnel had been 
successful under his claim, Mr. Barker would have been subject to paying attorneys fees
and costs under the contract. The “writing that formed the basis of the lawsuit” was the 
contract between Bushnell and the Company. Under the reciprocity statute, it is only by
making Bushnell subject to paying those fees and costs if he loses that the statutes
purpose as explained in Bilanzich is met.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Bilanzich
either overturns the Anglin holding or narrows its interpretation to its facts. In either
event the result would be that the trial court’s holding that Mr. Barker is not entitled to
his requested attorney fees is legally in error.
The second issue before this court is whether the trial court in erred in failing to
award costs. Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, AExcept when
express provision therefore is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs...@ .
It is undisputed that Mr. Barker was the prevailing party with respect to the third party
complaint. Accordingly, Mr. Barker should have been awarded his costs of Court
pursuant to the Rule. The trial court however held that no costs were awarded to Mr.
6Barker. That holding was chalenged in Mr. Barker’s Rule 59 motion.
In its ruling on Mr. Barker’s Rule 59 motion the trial court stated “The issue of 
costs is not properly before the Court at this time because the Court has not disallowed
costs for Mr. Barker…The Court has not yet entered judgment on the Third-Party
Complaint and therefore the issue of costs is premature at this point.” R.599. The Court’s 
ruling is plainly in error. The trial court entered its order denying an award of costs, on
September 19, 2008. The hearing on Mr. Barker’s Rule 59 Motion was held September, 
2009 and the court’s order claiming the costs had not been denied was dated October 21,
2009.  The trial court’s ruling on the Rule 59 motion constitutes plain eror.  Since the 
trial court was under the misperception that it had not denied the costs, the trial court’s 
denial of the Rule 59 motion should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. MR. BARKER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER FEES ON HIS SUCCESSFUL
DEFENSE OF THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT.
UCA Section 78-27-56.5 provides:
A court may award costs and attorney=s fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract,
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney=s fees.
In his Third Party Complaint, Mr. Bushnell argued that Dale K. Barker Co. P.C.
(The ACompany@) was the alter ego of Mr. Barker and that accordingly the contract
between the Company and Mr. Bushnell was enforceable against Mr. Barker. Mr. Barker
argued that since Mr. Bushnell would have been entitled to his attorney fees, under the
7contract, if he were successful then under the statute Mr. Barker should likewise be
entitled to his fees in opposing the claim.
The Court rejected this approach in its Memorandum Decision. There the Court
stated:
Focusing next on Mr. Barker=s Request for Attorney Fees, it is important to note
that the Court in this case, pursuant to a Rule 50(a) Motion for Directed Verdict,
found in Mr. Barker=s favor that both Mr. Bushnell=s third-party actions for breach
of contract and professional negligence were based upon a theory of alter ego and
that Mr. Bushnell had not provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case to pierce the corporate veil. Accordingly, the Corporation, not Mr. Barker,
was the party to the contract on which Mr. Barker bases his claim of fees. As a
result, Mr. Barker is not entitled to fees. As fees cannot be awarded to Mr. Barker
because there was no contract between Mr. Barker and Mr. Bushnell, Mr. Barker=s
Request for Attorney Fees is, respectfully, denied.
Memorandum Decision page 3. R.432.
The Court=s holding, at first blush, appears to be consistent with the holding of the
Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc.,
37 P.3d 267 (Utah App. 2001). There the Court, in interpreting the reciprocal fees statute
cited above, held that only parties to the instrument upon which fees were sought were
entitled to use the reciprocal fees statute. This holding however was impliedly overturned
by the Utah Supreme Court decision in Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2007).
In Bilanzich the Utah Supreme Court stated, Awe hold that Utah Code section 78-
27-56.5 grants the district court discretion to award attorney fees and costs to a prevailing
party if the writing that forms the basis of the lawsuit provides attorney fees for at
least one party.@ Bilanzich at 1043 (emphasis added). In Bilanzich the issue was
whether a party to the lawsuit could recover fees where the agreement on which the claim
8was made was itself unenforceable. In deciding this issue the Supreme Court undertook a
detailed analysis of the policies underlying the statute. The Court stated:
Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 was designed to Acreate a level playing field@ for
parties to a contractual dispute. The statute levels the playing field by allowing
both parties to recover fees where only one party may assert such a right under
contract, remedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many
contracts of adhesion. In addition, this statute rectifies the inequitable common
law result where a party that seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney
fees clause has a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to
invalidate the contract. The former could demand attorney fees if successful,
while the latter could not.
Consequently, in order to further the statute=s purpose, the exposure to the risk of a
contractual obligation to pay attorney fees must give rise to a corresponding risk
of a statutory obligation to pay fees. In exercising their discretion therefore,
district courts should award fees liberally under Utah Code section 78-27-56.5
where pursuing or defending an action results in an unequal exposure to the
contractual liability for attorney fees.
Bilanzich at 1046 (citations omitted).
Under the Supreme Court=s holding in Bilanzich UCA section 78-27-56.5 comes
into play where the writing that forms the basis of the lawsuit provides attorney fees for
at least one party. The Court=s holding does not require the writing provide fees for all
parties. The stated purpose of the statute is to Alevel the playing field.@ The playing field
is only leveled if both parties are subject to the same risks on terms of litigation costs.
The Utah Supreme Court ruling in Bilanzich, entered in 2007, impliedly overturns the
prior Court of Appeals rule.
It is possible to read the Bilanzich and Anglin cases in a fashion where they are
consistent. In Anglin a garnishee, who successfully defended against a garnishment
9action, sought to recover its attorney fees under the basis of the promissory note that was
between two other parties. The Utah Court of Appeals declined to grant the request for
attorney fees on the basis that the third party was not a party under the original contract.
The Anglin case differs from our case in that in Anglin there was no claim made
against the third party on the basis of the contract itself. Since the third party could not
have had to pay attorney fees pursuant to the contract, it should not have been able to
receive them in defeating the claims made. In the instant case Bushnell claimed Mr.
Barker was liable under the terms of the contract. Mr. Bushnell claimed that he was a
party to the contract and had Mr. Bushnell been successful on his alter ego claim Mr.
Barker would have been a party to the contract and subject to the contractual provisions.
In Bilanzich, the party seeking attorney fees had established that the contract under
which he was sought to be held liable was itself an unenforceable agreement. In essence
there was no contract entered. This fact pattern is much more similar to this case than the
Anglin fact pattern. Had the party opposing the contract in Bilanzich failed in their
defenses they would have been subject to the contract and subject to the attorney fees
provision. In the instant case had Mr. Barker failed in his defenses he would have been
deemed to be a party to the contract and subject to the attorney fees provision.
This case is the very situation which the Utah Supreme Court was addressing in
Bilanzich as the purpose for UCA § 78-27-56.5. This is the case where the playing field
needs to be leveled so that each side has equal risks in litigation.
10
Because the Court did not apply Bilanzich in this mater, the Court’s prior ruling 
denying fees is against the law and/or is an error in law. Third party Defendant
respectfully, requests that this Court reverse the prior ruling or that this Court amend the
judgment in favor of the third party Defendant allowing an award of attorney fees.
II. MR. BARKER IS ENTITLED TO HIS COSTS.
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, AExcept when
express provision therefore is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs...@ .
It is undisputed that Mr. Barker was the prevailing party with respect to the third
party complaint. Accordingly, Mr. Barker should have been awarded his costs of Court
pursuant to the Rule. The trial court however held that no costs were awarded to Mr.
Barker. That holding was chalenged in Mr. Barker’s Rule 59 motion.
In its ruling on Mr. Barker’s Rule 59 motion the trial court stated “The issue of 
costs is not properly before the Court at this time because the Court has not disallowed
costs for Mr. Barker…The Court has not yet entered judgment on the Third-Party
Complaint and therefore the issue of costs is premature at this point.” R.599. The Court’s 
ruling is plainly in error. The trial court entered its order denying an award of costs, on
September 19, 2008. The hearing on Mr. Barker’s Rule 59 Motion was held September
23, 2009 and the court’s order claiming the costs had not beendenied was dated October
21, 2009. The trial court’s ruling on the Rule 59 motion constitutes plain eror. Since the 
trial court was under the misperception that it had not denied the costs, the trial court’s 
11
denial of the Rule 59 motion should be reversed.
Mr. Barker accordingly requests this Court overturn the trial court’s order which
denied Mr. Barker his costs.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court in Bilanzich, made it clear that the reciprocal atorney’s 
fees statute serves the purpose of leveling the playing field in litigation. Where one party
would be entitled to fees, under a contract, if successful, the opposing party is likewise
entitled to fees if it prevails. The trial court’s narow reading of Bilanzich fails to meet
this express purposeof the statute and is accordingly contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
holding.
Rule 54 awards costs as a matter of course to the prevailing party. Here, there is
no question that Mr. Barker was the prevailing party, and there is no reason given for the
failure to award costs. Accordingly, this court should reverse this portion of the
judgment as well.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2009
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON
_______________________________________
Shawn D. Turner
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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